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Abstract 
A number of lab experiments in recent years have analyzed people’s willingness to compete. 
But to what extent is competitive behavior in the lab associated with field choices and 
outcomes? We address this question in a setting of entrepreneurship, where we combine lab 
evidence on competitiveness with field evidence on investment, employment decisions, profits, 
and sales as measures of competitive choices and successful outcomes. We find strong 
evidence that competitiveness in the lab is positively associated with competitive choices in the 
field, and weaker but suggestive evidence of a positive link to successful field outcomes. Other 
relevant cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills measured in the lab, including risk- and time 
preferences and confidence, are less consistently associated with the field variables. Our 
findings thus suggest that the willingness to compete in the lab identifies an important 
entrepreneurial trait that shapes the entrepreneur’s field choices and to some extent also field 
outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a growing literature studying competitive behavior in the lab, but little is 
still known about how competitive behavior in the lab is associated with field choices, 
and even less is known about how it is associated with field outcomes.1 Buser et al. 
(2014) and Zhang (2012) study secondary school students and demonstrate that 
competitive choices in the lab are associated with entry into competitive study 
profiles and exams. These studies do not consider field outcomes, even though it is 
clearly important to understand whether the students made the right educational 
choices. Clearly, choosing to compete is not necessarily a winning strategy, and 
therefore, ultimately, we would also like to know whether competitive behavior in 
the lab maps into successful outcomes in the field.  
 
Our study contributes to fill these gaps in the literature by studying the association 
between competitiveness in the lab and field variables in a setting of 
entrepreneurship, using a group of small-scale business owners in Tanzania as 
subject pool.2 This sample is attractive for studying the association between the lab 
and the field for two reasons. First, business profit is arguably a relevant measure of 
a successful field outcome. Second, small-scale entrepreneurs are typically decision 
makers in their businesses, implying that entrepreneurial traits such as willingness to 
compete are likely to have direct implications for business choices and outcomes. We 
use investment and employment decisions as indicators of competitive field choices, 
as these may be used to give a firm a competitive advantage relative to other firms 
(by increasing capacity and lowering marginal costs), and business profits and sales 
as the key measures of entrepreneurial success. These field variables were collected 
from the entrepreneurs over a period of two years.   
 
The entrepreneurs in our study also took part in a lab experiment where we 
measured both cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills, including the willingness to 
compete, risk- and time preferences and confidence. Our main focus in the present 
analysis is the extent to which the willingness to compete in the lab is associated with 
field choices and field outcomes, even when we control for cognitive skills, other 
non-cognitive skills, and background variables. The study also allows us to shed 
light on the association between these other lab variables and field choices and 
                                                        
1 Key contributions to the experimental literature on competitiveness include Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007), Booth and Nolen (2012), Flory et al. (2010), Gneezy et al. (2003, 2009), Gneezy and Rustichini 
(2004), and Healy and Pate (2011). See also Fortin (2008), who shows that individuals who self-report 
being more competitive have higher wages and earn more and Örs et al (2008), who find that women 
perform worse than men in a competitive setting, but outperform men in a less competitive setting. 
See Levitt and List, (2007a,b) and Falk and Fehr (2003) for discussions of the external validity of lab 
experiments. 
2 On the determinants of entrepreneurship more generally, see Becker (1975), Lazear (2004, 2005), 
Heckman et al. (2006), Hall and Woodward (2010), Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn (2009), Read and 
van Leeuwen (1998), Doepke and Zilibotti (2013), and Acs et al. (2005). 
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outcomes, and may thus inform us about the relative importance of competitiveness 
preferences in understanding the behavior and success of small-scale entrepreneurs 
in a development context.    
 
Our study shows that (i) there is a strong and robust association between competitive 
behavior in the lab and investment and employment choices in the field, (ii) that 
entrepreneurs who compete in the lab tend to have higher profits than those who do 
not compete, and (iii) that willingness to compete is the entrepreneurial characteristic 
that is most consistently associated with competitive choices and successful 
outcomes; other cognitive and non-cognitive skills have less consistent explanatory 
power. 
 
A number of other important studies have shown that risk- and time preferences 
measured in the lab are strongly associated with field behavior. Sutter et al. (2013) 
show this for health, savings, and conduct at school, using a of a sample of children 
and adolescents, and Dohmen et al. (2011) and Fisher (2010) show that risk 
preferences in particular are strongly associated with career choice. 3  Our study 
differs from the previous studies in two important ways. First, by focusing on small-
scale entrepreneurs in a development context, we consider a very different sample 
than all previous studies. Second, these previous studies did not focus on 
competitiveness preferences, and thus we do not know whether the earlier results 
would have been sensitive to the inclusion of a measure of the willingness to 
compete. These differences may partly explain why we find less of a role for risk- 
and time preferences in explaining field behavior than the earlier studies. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the 
data from the lab and from the field. In section 3, we present the results from our 
study. In section 4, we draw our main conclusions. 
 
2. Sample and data 
Our sample consists of 207 small-scale entrepreneurs in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, all 
members of one of the leading microfinance institutions in the country, PRIDE 
Tanzania. Most of them are involved in small-scale commerce (running a small kiosk, 
having a stall at the market) or different sorts of service activities (hairdressing, small 
restaurants), with a few also involved in light manufacturing (tailoring, carpentry, 
brick making) or agriculture. They are organized in loan groups of five entrepreneurs, 
who are jointly responsible for each other’s loans in the microfinance institution. 
There are 143 loan groups represented in our sample. The entrepreneurs formed part 
                                                        
3 A number of other interesting studies relating lab experiments on social preferences and trust and 
field behavior include Ashraf et al., 2006; Benz and Meier, 2008; Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Karlan, 2005; 
Meier and Sprenger, 2010, Jakiela et al., 2010).  
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of a larger randomized control trial on entrepreneurship promotion, involving more 
than 600 subjects, documented in Berge et al. (2014). Half of the entrepreneurs in our 
sample had randomly been offered business training as part of the larger research 
project (the training program was completed in January 2009), and all of them 
subsequently received a 100 000 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) business grant (around 80 
USD).  
 
The lab data are from March 2009. The entrepreneurs in our sample were randomly 
selected to take part in the lab experiment among all the entrepreneurs involved in 
the larger randomized control trial. The field data are from two survey rounds that 
we conducted in June-July 2009 and June-September 2011, where we visited all the 
entrepreneurs at their business premises. We managed to interview 207 out of the 
211 entrepreneurs in at least one of the survey rounds, 194 in 2007 and 197 in 2011, 
and thus we have very low attrition.4 In addition, we use background data (age and 
education) from the baseline survey that we conducted in June-July 2008.   
 
The upper part of Table 1 provides more details about the background of the 
entrepreneurs. We observe that the majority of the entrepreneurs in our sample are 
females, in line with the gender distribution in PRIDE. The average entrepreneur is 
39 years old, married, and has completed primary schooling (which is seven years in 
Tanzania), but we observe that there is substantial heterogeneity both in age (ranging 
from 22 to 63 years) and in education (ranging from 0 to 18 years).  
 
The lower part of Table 1 provides an overview of the field choices and field 
outcomes that we focus on in the analysis. These variables are self-reported by the 
entrepreneurs. Investments are measured as total investments in the two survey 
rounds, excluding purchases of stocks. Typical investments are sewing machines for 
tailors, cooking equipment, fridges, chairs and tables for small restaurants or kiosk 
owners, or general refurbishment of business premises. Average total investments 
are 762 000 TZS (approximately 610 USD), where 16% of the entrepreneurs had no 
investments in the survey period.  
 
We study two types of employment choices; the number of employees in the 
business and how active the entrepreneur decides to be in the employer-employee 
relationship. The number of employees is measured as the average number of 
workers in the business in the two survey rounds, and can be interpreted as an 
indicator of growth in the business. We observe that the average entrepreneur has 
slightly less than one worker and that almost 35% of the entrepreneurs do not have 
                                                        
4 For the entrepreneurs that we reached in only one of the survey rounds, we use this observation and 
adjust accordingly. For variables where we use the average value in the period, we use the single 
observation as the average value. For variables where we use the total value in the period, we assume 
that the one observation also is representative for the other survey round.  
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any worker in the business, while no entrepreneur has more than six workers. To 
study the employer-employee relationship, we consider the total number of times the 
entrepreneur has fired a worker or given a worker a bonus in the survey period. Both 
firing of workers and the offering of bonuses to workers may increase the 
competitiveness of the business, by reducing the number of low-productive workers 
and increasing worker productivity. We observe that the average entrepreneur has 
fired 0.75 workers and given a bonus to 1.2 workers in the period. Almost 70% of the 
entrepreneurs have not fired any workers and 46% of the entrepreneurs have not 
given any bonuses in the survey period.  
 
Regarding field outcomes, we focus on self-reported profits and sales, where sales 
are seen as an alternative proxy for profits. Obtaining high quality data on profits 
and sales from small-scale entrepreneurs in a development context is notoriously 
difficult, since few entrepreneurs have reliable records. We therefore rely on self-
reported data also for the field outcomes, in line with de Mel et al. (2007, 2008, 2009) 
and Karlan and Valdivia (2011). Specifically, we consider average monthly sales and 
average monthly operating profits in the survey period. The average entrepreneur 
has monthly sales of 2 330 000 TZS (approximately 1865 USD), and a profit margin of 
26%. Two entrepreneurs report not having any sales or profits in the period. 
 
In the lab we collected data on a broad set of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and 
Table 2 provides an overview of the different measures.5 We have three measures of 
cognitive skills; math skills, business knowledge, and general knowledge, all based 
on the performance of the entrepreneur on different incentivized multiple-choice 
questions (250 TZS per correct answer) and all ranging from 0 (no question answered 
correctly) to 10 (all questions answered correctly).6 The math questions consisted of 
adding numbers; the business questions were on best practice in business, covering 
topics such as customer care, employee management, time management, and 
definitions of sales, profits, variable costs, and working capital; the general topics 
covered current events in sports and politics as well as questions on health and 
Tanzanian geography.  
 
From the upper part of Table 2, we observe that the business questions seem to have 
been easiest for the entrepreneurs; the average entrepreneur answered on seven out 
of ten questions correctly. On math and general knowledge, the average score was 
about five correct answers. We also observe that there is considerable heterogeneity 
in the sample. About 15% of the entrepreneurs had nine or ten correct answers on the 
math questions, while 30% of the entrepreneurs had no more than three correct 
                                                        
5 More details about the lab can be found in Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010). The lab instructions are 
provided in Appendix B.  
6 All the multiple-choice questions used in the lab are provided in Appendix C. 
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answers. We observe similar differences for the business knowledge and general 
knowledge questions.  
 
The non-cognitive skills we focus on in the analysis are willingness to compete, risk- 
and time preferences, and confidence. To measure the entrepreneurs’ willingness to 
compete, we announced a second round of new multiple-choice questions on the 
same six topics that we used to measure the cognitive skills, but this time the 
participants had to decide whether to compete or not. If entrepreneurs decided to 
compete on a topic and performed better than “a typical microcredit client”, they 
were paid 750 TZS per correct answer, otherwise nothing.7  If the entrepreneurs 
decided not to compete, they were paid a flat rate of 250 TZS per correct answer. The 
entrepreneurs had to make the competitiveness choice for each of the six topics, 
which means that the measure of willingness to compete ranges from zero to six.  
 
Our measure of confidence is non-incentivized. After the completion of each of the 
six sets of multiple-choice questions in the first round (when everyone was paid the 
flat piece rate of 250 TZS). The participants were asked: “Do you believe that you are 
better than, equal to, or worse than a typical microcredit client in answering 
questions on topic X?” The confidence variable ranges from minus six (the 
entrepreneur believes he or she is worse on all the topics) to six (the entrepreneur 
believes he or she is better on all the topics). The confidence measure is zero if the 
entrepreneur believes that he or she is equally good as a typical microcredit client on 
all topics.  
 
From Table 2, we observe that the entrepreneurs on average chose to compete on 
more than half of the topics (3.72 out of 6), even though on average they were not 
confident about their own abilities. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the willingness 
to compete measured by gender. We observe that more than 30% of the 
entrepreneurs chose to compete in all six rounds, while around 15% never competed. 
In line with the existing literature (see for instance Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), 
we also find a significant gender difference in the willingness to compete; males are 
on average much more willing to compete than females to compete (4.5 times versus 
3.3 times). 
 
To measure risk preferences, the entrepreneurs were presented with four situations 
where they could choose between a risky alternative with two equally likely 
outcomes, 6000 TZS or nothing, and a safe alternative. The value of the safe 
alternative varied across the four situations, taking the values 1000 TZS, 1500 TZS, 
                                                        
7 We used the phrase “a typical microcredit client” to simplify the language in the experimental 
instructions. The benchmark that the entrepreneurs had to beat in the competitive setting was the 
average score on these multiple-choice questions in a pilot we conducted with other clients of PRIDE 
Tanzania. None of the participants in the lab asked us for the precise definition of the benchmark. 
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2000 TZS, and 2500 TZS respectively. We use the number of times the entrepreneur 
chose the risky alternative as our measure of the willingness to take risk, which 
therefore ranges from zero to four. 8  From Table 2, we observe that the average 
entrepreneur chose the risky alternative twice. 21% of the entrepreneurs chose to 
compete in all four situations, while 15% of the entrepreneurs never competed.  
 
Time preferences were measured by offering the entrepreneurs different alternatives 
for when to receive the participation fee for the lab experiment, where they would 
receive a larger participation fee by delaying the payment date. The participants 
could choose between being paid one week after the lab and receive 15 000 Tsh, three 
weeks after the lab and receive 20 000 TZS, and five weeks after the lab and receive 
25 000 TZS.9  Hence, by delaying payment by four weeks, their participation fee 
would increase by 67 percent. We use the number of weeks they chose to wait for the 
participation fee as our measure of time preferences, which means that this variable 
takes the value of 1, 3 or 5. From Table 2, we observe that the average entrepreneur 
waited slightly more than three weeks. Almost 50% of the entrepreneurs waited five 
weeks, while 31% of the entrepreneurs only waited one week. 
3. Empirical strategy 
Our main aim is to study how the entrepreneurs’ field choices (investments, number 
of workers, number of workers fired, and number of workers given a bonus) and 
field outcomes (profits and sales) are associated with cognitive skills (math skills, 
business knowledge, and general knowledge) and non-cognitive skills (willingness to 
compete, confidence, and risk- and time preferences) measured in the lab.  
 
For this purpose, we run standard OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a 
field variable and the explanatory variables are the non-cognitive lab variables 
(compete, risk, time, and confidence), the cognitive lab variables (math, business 
knowledge and general knowledge), and a set of background variables (training, 
female, age, education, and marital status). Standard errors are clustered at the loan 
group level, since loan group members are jointly liable for their loans and the error 
term therefore may be correlated within these groups.  
 
We consider both untransformed outcomes and log-transformed outcomes when 
analyzing investments, profits and sales, while we only consider the untransformed 
outcomes for the employment variables. The untransformed outcomes are always 
mean-standardized. When considering log-transformed outcomes, we face the 
problem that 34 entrepreneurs have not invested anything in the survey period and 
                                                        
8 Note that our measure or risk aversion only captures different levels of risk aversion, and can 
therefore not identify whether the entrepreneurs are risk neutral or risk loving.  
9 To minimize the issue of trust when comparing the different payment alternatives, all alternatives 
implied that the payment would take place in the future. Being paid immediately was not an option.   
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two entrepreneurs have zero profit. In these cases, we replace the actual value with 
the lowest observed value in the sample.  
 
The focus of our analysis is the estimated coefficients for the lab variables. Even 
though these estimates cannot be given a causal interpretation, they will shed light 
on whether there is an association between lab behavior and field choices and 
outcomes for the entrepreneurs. 10  A worry with our empirical strategy might, 
however, be that the different lab variables are strongly correlated. In Table A1 in 
Appendix A we therefore report the correlation matrix for all the lab measures. We 
observe that the correlations between the different non-cognitive skills are very weak, 
while, not surprisingly, there are stronger correlations among the three cognitive 
skills measures. In the following, we will supplement the main analysis with 
robustness tests that show that our results are not driven by multicollinearity in the 
data. 
4. Results 
We here report the main regression showing how the lab variables are associated 
with the field choices and outcomes. 
 
Table 3 reports the regressions with investment as the dependent variable. We 
observe that for all specifications, the willingness to compete in the lab is strongly 
and consistently associated with investments in the field. Columns (1)-(3) report 
regressions where the investment variable is untransformed, and the estimated 
coefficients show that competing one more time in the lab is associated with an 
increase in total investments in the field of 0.04 – 0.06 standard deviations. If we 
consider the specifications where the investment variable is log-transformed, 
columns (4)-(6), we find that the estimated coefficients on the willingness to compete 
are associated with an increase in total investments of 13-20%. Importantly, we also 
observe that the association between competing in the lab and total investments is 
robust to the inclusion of both other lab variables and background variables. 
 
We also observe that the willingness to compete is the only lab variable that is 
consistently associated with total investments in the field. Risk preferences are 
strongly associated with total investments when the dependent variable is log-
transformed, where more risky behavior in the lab is associated with more total 
investments in the field. But the point estimates for risk are negative, although not 
significant, in the regressions where the investment variable is untransformed. Time 
preferences and confidence in the lab are not consistently associated with total 
investments in the field for any of the specifications. The three measures of cognitive 
skills are in almost all cases positively associated with total investments, but this 
                                                        
10 Note that the background variable “Training” has a causal interpretation, given the randomized 
design described in Berge et al. (2014).  
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association is only statistically significant for the general knowledge variable when 
we use the log-transformed dependent variable and include demographic controls.11   
 
Turning to Table 4, we observe that the willingness to compete is also consistently 
and significantly associated with all the employment decisions, even when we 
include other lab variables and other background variables. Columns (1)-(3) show 
that one more competitive choice in the lab is associated with an increase in the 
number of workers in the business by 0.05-0.06 standard deviations; columns (4)-(9) 
suggest an association of the same magnitude between competitive behavior in the 
lab and the number of fired workers and bonuses offered in the period. For 
employment decisions, we also observe that there is some association between the 
risk- and time preferences in the lab and employment decisions in the field. The time 
preferences are statistically significant for all three employment variables, where we 
observe that patience in the lab is associated with employing fewer workers, firing 
fewer workers, and giving fewer bonuses. For risk preferences, we observe that risky 
behavior in the lab is associated with firing more workers, but not significantly 
associated with the other two employment decisions. Further, we observe that there 
is a positive association between confidence in the lab and the number of workers 
that the entrepreneur has given a bonus. It is an open question how to interpret the 
associations observed for risk- and time preferences and confidence, but for our 
analysis the important point is that the inclusion of these variables does not affect the 
strong association we find between competitive behavior in the lab and competitive 
employment decisions in the field. Finally, we observe that there are no significant 
associations between the lab measures of cognitive skills and employment decisions 
in the field. 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 report regressions of the field outcomes (profits and sales) on lab 
variables and background variables. We observe that the willingness to compete in 
the lab is positively associated with the profits of the business, although the 
association is not as strong as for investment or employment choices and only 
statistically significant when we consider the specification where the dependent 
variable is untransformed. From columns (1)-(3), we observe that choosing to 
compete one more time in the lab is associated with an increase in profits by 0.05-0.06 
standard deviations. We also observe from Table 5 that willingness to compete is the 
only variable that is significantly associated with profits. Table 6 shows the 
regressions for sales on lab variables and background variables, where we observe 
that none of the explanatory variables are statistically significant, with the exception 
of risk preferences in the log-transformed specification that includes both lab 
variables and background variables.  
                                                        
11 Here and in the following, we do not focus on the estimated coefficients for the background 
variables. For a further analysis of the larger data set including all the entrepreneurs involved in the 
randomized control trial, see Berge et al. (2014). 
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Robustness checks largely confirm our main results. First, to see whether the results 
are partly driven by multicollinearity, we have regressed the field choices and field 
outcomes separately on each of the lab variables. The main picture from our multiple 
variable regressions holds; the willingness to compete clearly stands out as the lab-
measure that is most systematically associated with the field variables (see Table A2 
in Appendix A).  
 
Second, inspired by Grosse and Reiner (2010) and Günther et al. (2009), who show 
that the type of task may matter for competitive behavior, we also study whether the 
association between the willingness to compete and field variables is specific for 
certain topics. We therefore regress the field variables separately on each of the six 
compete decisions in the lab (see Table A3 in appendix A). Although we find some 
differences among the domains, no clear pattern stands out, indicating that our 
results are largely not domain sensitive.  
 
Third, we considered whether the entrepreneurs who make successful competition 
choices in the lab mainly drive the results. For this optimality analysis, we rely on the 
framework introduced in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), where they distinguish 
between the ex ante and ex post approach. The ex ante approach considers whether 
the participant made a successful choice given the performance in the first round, 
while the ex post approach considers whether the participant made a successful 
choice given how he or she actually performed in the competition. As shown in Table 
A8 in Appendix A, the ex ante approach provides a stronger association with field 
outcomes than the ex post approach, but none of them outperform the competition 
variable used in the main analysis.12  
 
Finally, given that our field variables are self-reported by the entrepreneur, one 
might question whether our results are driven by a correlation between the 
willingness to compete and a willingness to over report, for example, profits and 
sales. In the 2011 survey, we introduced a test of “bragging”, where we asked the 
entrepreneurs about their knowledge of different business terms. Half of these 
business terms were meaningless, and thus we take as a measure of bragging the 
number of meaningless business terms that the entrepreneur claimed to know. All 
our results are robust to the inclusion of this variable in the analysis.13  
  
In sum, our analysis shows that the willingness to compete in the lab is strongly and 
consistently associated with field choices (investments and employment decisions), 
while the evidence on a positive association with field outcomes is more suggestive 
                                                        
12 In Table A9 in the Appendix A, we also show that the willingness to compete is strongly positively 
associated with the amount of money an entrepreneur were paid overall in the lab.  
13 We have not included the variable in the regressions, because it reduces the sample size (we have this 
variable only for the entrepreneurs that we reached in 2011). 
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for profits and absent for sales. This weaker relationship with field outcomes is not 
surprising. First, field outcomes such as profits and sales are harder to measure than 
the variables capturing the field choices. Second, the entrepreneurs clearly have less 
control over field outcomes than field choices. Entrepreneurs can directly implement 
investments and employment decisions, while profits or sales are to an important 
extent determined by market factors beyond the entrepreneurs’ control.  
 
The literature on competitiveness has been particularly concerned with gender issues, 
and thus in Appendix A we also extend our main analysis to include gender 
interaction effects for the willingness to compete. As shown in Tables A4-A7, no 
systematic pattern emerges. The association between competition in the lab and field 
variables seems to be stronger for female entrepreneurs when we consider 
investments, but stronger for male entrepreneurs when we consider the number of 
workers in the business. In all the other cases, the gender interaction effect is 
insignificant.  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
To what extent can competitive behavior in the lab say something about real world 
choices and outcomes? Given the large number of lab experiments on 
competitiveness, surprisingly few studies have so far emerged addressing this 
question.  
 
Our study shows that the willingness to compete in the lab is strongly associated 
with field choices made by small-scale entrepreneurs in a development context, and 
to some extent also positively associated with the profits of their businesses. Other 
non-cognitive skills, such as risk- and time preferences and confidence, as well as 
cognitive skills, are also associated with some field variables, but arguably less 
consistently than competitiveness. Our results therefore suggest that the willingness 
to compete is a key entrepreneurial trait, and possibly more important than other 
non-cognitive skills often measured in the lab. An important avenue for further 
research is certainly to see whether our results are robust for small-scale 
entrepreneurs in other contexts, and more broadly whether there is an association 
between the willingness to compete in the lab and important field outcomes for other 
groups in society.  
 
Our results may be of importance for policy interventions aiming at empowering 
small-scale entrepreneurs, particularly females who typically are less willing to 
compete than males. They suggest an increased focus on the importance of being 
willing to compete in order to succeed in business, even though the optimal level of 
competitive behavior is still an open question both in the lab and in the field.  
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6. Figures and tables 
 
 
Figure 1. Competitiveness and Gender. The figure shows the distribution of the number of times the entrepreneurs 
decided to compete, by gender. 
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Table 1: The Field 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Background     
Female 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Age 38.88 8.08 22 63 
Education 7.87 2.39 0 18 
Marital status           0.71 0.45 0 1 
Training 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Choices     
Investment (in 1000 TZS) 762 1390 0 10552 
No. of workers 0.89 1.02 0 6 
No. of fired workers 0.75 1.62 0 13 
No. of workers given bonus 1.19 1.82 0 16 
Outcomes     
Profit (in 1000 TZS) 613 745 0 7136 
Sales (in 1000 TZS) 2330 3096 0 18970 
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of the field variables for the 207 entrepreneurs that we reached 
in the survey rounds. Background: Female is a dummy indicating if the entrepreneur is a female. Age is the 
age of the entrepreneur, in years. Education is the years of schooling. Marital status is a dummy indicating 
if the client is married. Training is a dummy indicating if the entrepreneur was offered business training. 
Choice: Investment is total investments summarized over the two survey rounds (in 1000 TZS). No. of 
workers is the average number of workers across the two survey rounds. No. of fired workers is the number 
of fired workers summarized over the two surveys. No. of workers given bonus is the number of workers 
given a bonus summarized over the two surveys. Outcomes: Profit is the average profit across the two 
survey rounds (1000 TZS). Sales is the average profit across the two survey rounds (1000 TZS) 
 
Table 2: The Lab 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Cognitive skills 
Math 
Business knowledge 
General knowledge 
Non-cognitive skills 
Compete 
 
5.31 
6.96 
5.09 
 
3.72 
 
2.83 
1.98 
1.53 
 
2.24 
 
0 
0 
2 
 
0 
 
10 
10 
9 
 
6 
Confidence 
Risk 
-0.75 
2.01 
2.32 
1.34 
-6 
0 
6 
4 
Time 3.36 1.76 1 5 
 
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of the lab variables for the 207 entrepreneurs that we reached in 
the survey rounds. Cognitive skills: Math is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test 
on additions. Business knowledge is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on 
business facts and practices. General knowledge is the average number of correct answers (0-10) on four 
general topics (sports and leisure, politics, health and nutrition, and places in Dar es Salaam and 
Tanzania). Non-cognitive skills: Compete is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur decided to 
compete (0-6). Confidence is measured on a scale from minus six (worse than the others) to six (better than 
17 
the others). Risk is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur chose the risky alternative (0-4). 
Time is the number of weeks the client chose to wait before collecting the participation fee (1, 3 or 5 weeks)
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Table 3: Investment 
  Investment (Standardized)  Investment (log) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Lab Compete 0.057*** 0.042* 0.053**  0.181*** 0.133* 0.144** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.026)  (0.064) (0.069) (0.072) 
 Risk  -0.035 -0.012   0.247** 0.279*** 
   (0.058) (0.053)   (0.100) (0.101) 
 Time  0.035 0.038   -0.107 -0.101 
   (0.041) (0.042)   (0.078) (0.076) 
 Confidence  -0.006 0.002   -0.082 -0.093 
   (0.023) (0.028)   (0.057) (0.062) 
 Math  0.009 0.000   0.002 -0.012 
   (0.024) (0.026)   (0.051) (0.056) 
 Business knowledge  0.012 0.008   0.122 0.087 
   (0.037) (0.039)   (0.090) (0.097) 
 General knowledge  0.069 0.099   0.160 0.209* 
   (0.053) (0.061)   (0.124) (0.124) 
Background  Training   0.143    0.539* 
    (0.135)    (0.285) 
 Female   0.381**    0.447 
    (0.190)    (0.357) 
 Age   0.007    -0.004 
    (0.011)    (0.018) 
 Education   0.024    0.031 
    (0.032)    (0.073) 
 Marital status   0.186    0.580* 
    (0.151)    (0.326) 
 Constant -0.212*** -0.696*** -1.790***  4.589*** 2.892*** 1.774 
  (0.081) (0.184) (0.651)  (0.279) (0.593) (1.243) 
 R2 0.016 0.037 0.080  0.039 0.114 0.152 
 N 207 207 207  207 207 207 
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Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions. The outcome in column 1-3 is the investments summarized over the two survey rounds, mean 
standardized. In column 4-6, the outcome is the log of investments. Compete is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur decided to compete (0-6). Risk 
is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur chose the risky alternative (0-4). Time is the number of weeks the client chose to wait before collecting the 
show up fee (1, 3 or 5 weeks). Confidence is measured on a scale from minus six (worse than the others) to six (better than the others). Math is the number of 
correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on additions. Business knowledge is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on business 
facts and practices. General knowledge is the average number of correct answers (0-10) on four general topics (sports and leisure, politics, health and nutrition, 
and places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania). Training is a dummy indicating if the entrepreneur was offered business training. Female is a dummy indicating the 
entrepreneur is a female. Age is the age of the entrepreneur, in years. Education is the years of schooling. Marital status is an indicator variable taking the value 
of one if the client is married. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 4: Employment 
  Number of workers  Number of fired workers  Number of workers given a bonus 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  
Lab Compete 0.056* 0.056* 0.058*  0.062** 0.060* 0.068*  0.051 0.060* 0.064* 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)  (0.030) (0.034) (0.036)  (0.031) (0.034) (0.037) 
 Risk  0.039 0.052   0.082** 0.093**   -0.028 -0.028 
   (0.058) (0.059)   (0.041) (0.046)   (0.044) (0.044) 
 Time  -0.116*** -0.120***   -0.104** -0.103**   -0.073* -0.069* 
   (0.044) (0.045)   (0.046) (0.046)   (0.037) (0.037) 
 Confidence  0.019 0.019   0.011 0.017   0.048* 0.059* 
   (0.030) (0.033)   (0.019) (0.020)   (0.027) (0.033) 
 Math  0.030 0.030   0.011 0.006   0.028 0.021 
   (0.032) (0.034)   (0.022) (0.026)   (0.028) (0.027) 
 Business knowledge  0.054 0.045   -0.004 0.003   0.039 0.040 
   (0.052) (0.059)   (0.049) (0.044)   (0.047) (0.054) 
 General knowledge  -0.081 -0.072   -0.004 0.018   -0.122 -0.108 
   (0.066) (0.069)   (0.051) (0.064)   (0.080) (0.078) 
Background Training   0.201    -0.023    -0.002 
    (0.147)    (0.132)    (0.156) 
 Female   0.119    0.222    0.166 
    (0.146)    (0.193)    (0.149) 
 Age   0.006    0.000    0.000 
    (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.007) 
 Education   0.014    -0.013    0.013 
    (0.030)    (0.025)    (0.028) 
 Married   0.019    0.104    -0.149 
    (0.196)    (0.147)    (0.200) 
 Constant -0.209 -0.003 -0.551  -0.230** -0.036 -0.339  -0.190* 0.316 0.146 
  (0.131) (0.269) (0.491)  (0.098) (0.320) (0.403)  (0.113) (0.313) (0.526) 
 R2 0.016 0.067 0.082  0.019 0.061 0.069  0.013 0.058 0.071 
 N 207 207 207  207 207 207  207 207 207 
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Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions. The outcome in column 1-3 is the average number of workers across the two survey rounds, mean 
standardized. In column 4-6, the outcome is the number of fired workers summarized over the two surveys, mean standardized. In column 7-9, the outcome is the 
number of workers given a bonus summarized over the two surveys, mean standardized. Compete is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur decided to 
compete (0-6). Risk is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur chose the risky alternative (0-4). Time is the number of weeks the client chose to wait 
before collecting the show up fee (1, 3 or 5 weeks). Confidence is measured on a scale from minus six (worse than the others) to six (better than the others). Math 
is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on additions. Business knowledge is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice 
test on business facts and practices. General knowledge is the average number of correct answers (0-10) on four general topics (sports and leisure, politics, health 
and nutrition, and places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania). Training is a dummy indicating if the entrepreneur was offered business training. Female is a 
dummy indicating the entrepreneur is a female. Age is the age of the entrepreneur, in years. Education is the years of schooling. Marital status is an indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the client is married. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 5: Profit 
  Profit (standardized)  Profit (log) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Lab Compete 0.060** 0.049* 0.049*  0.025 0.026 0.019 
  (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) 
 Risk  -0.062 -0.082   -0.049 -0.062 
   (0.051) (0.056)   (0.041) (0.042) 
 Time  0.047 0.060   -0.010 -0.005 
   (0.041) (0.045)   (0.030) (0.031) 
 Confidence  -0.006 0.003   -0.015 -0.024 
   (0.031) (0.041)   (0.023) (0.025) 
 Math  0.031 0.019   0.027 0.026 
   (0.033) (0.031)   (0.024) (0.026) 
 Business knowledge  0.031 0.029   0.033 0.021 
   (0.037) (0.043)   (0.032) (0.034) 
 General knowledge  0.019 0.023   -0.033 -0.047 
   (0.080) (0.086)   (0.049) (0.053) 
Background Training   -0.138    0.035 
    (0.155)    (0.118) 
 Female   0.051    -0.171 
    (0.182)    (0.137) 
 Age   -0.009    -0.007 
    (0.010)    (0.007) 
 Education   0.025    0.016 
    (0.029)    (0.028) 
 Marital status   -0.212    0.013 
    (0.190)    (0.129) 
 Constant -0.222*** -0.700* -0.313  6.086*** 5.999*** 6.405*** 
  (0.069) (0.400) (0.780)  (0.085) (0.231) (0.432) 
 R2 0.018 0.050 0.072  0.006 0.034 0.051 
 N 207 207 207  207 207 207 
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Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions. The outcome in column 1-3 is the average profit across the two survey rounds, mean standardized. In 
column 4-6, the outcome is the log of profits. Compete is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur decided to compete (0-6). Risk is measured as the 
number of times the entrepreneur chose the risky alternative (0-4). Time is the number of weeks the client chose to wait before collecting the show up fee (1, 3 or 5 
weeks). Confidence is measured on a scale from minus six (worse than the others) to six (better than the others). Math is the number of correct answers (0-10) on 
a multiple-choice test on additions. Business knowledge is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on business facts and practices. General 
knowledge is the average number of correct answers (0-10) on four general topics (sports and leisure, politics, health and nutrition, and places in Dar es Salaam 
and Tanzania). Training is a dummy indicating if the entrepreneur was offered business training. Female is a dummy indicating the entrepreneur is a female. 
Age is the age of the entrepreneur, in years. Education is the years of schooling. Marital status is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the client is 
married. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table 6: Sales 
  Sales (standardized)  Sales (log) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Lab Compete 0.023 0.013 0.007  0.008 0.010 -0.001 
  (0.034) (0.036) (0.037)  (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) 
 Risk  -0.065 -0.088   -0.066 -0.085* 
   (0.061) (0.062)   (0.052) (0.051) 
 Time  0.035 0.043   -0.009 -0.004 
   (0.039) (0.045)   (0.036) (0.038) 
 Confidence  -0.016 -0.019   -0.013 -0.028 
   (0.030) (0.035)   (0.028) (0.029) 
 Math  0.006 0.002   0.034 0.035 
   (0.037) (0.039)   (0.029) (0.034) 
 Business knowledge  0.053 0.045   0.035 0.015 
   (0.038) (0.045)   (0.037) (0.041) 
 General knowledge  0.012 0.006   -0.044 -0.060 
   (0.060) (0.063)   (0.056) (0.060) 
Background Training   -0.034    0.106 
    (0.159)    (0.151) 
 Female   -0.149    -0.267 
    (0.189)    (0.175) 
 Age   -0.013    -0.013 
    (0.009)    (0.008) 
 Education   0.005    0.009 
    (0.025)    (0.029) 
 Marital status   -0.140    0.009 
    (0.168)    (0.149) 
 Constant -0.084 -0.515 0.321  7.301*** 7.246*** 8.047*** 
  (0.120) (0.314) (0.497)  (0.123) (0.279) (0.456) 
 R2 0.003 0.030 0.047  0.000 0.027 0.059 
 N 207 207 207  207 207 207 
Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions. The outcome in column 1-3 is the average sales across the 
two survey rounds, mean standardized. In column 4-6, the outcome is the log of sales. Compete is measured as the 
number of times the entrepreneur decided to compete (0-6). Risk is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur 
chose the risky alternative (0-4). Time is the number of weeks the client chose to wait before collecting the show up 
fee (1, 3 or 5 weeks). Confidence is measured on a scale from minus six (worse than the others) to six (better than the 
others). Math is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on additions. Business knowledge is 
the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on business facts and practices. General knowledge is 
the average number of correct answers (0-10) on four general topics (sports and leisure, politics, health and nutrition, 
and places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania). Training is a dummy indicating if the entrepreneur was offered 
business training. Female is a dummy indicating the entrepreneur is a female. Age is the age of the entrepreneur, in 
years. Education is the years of schooling. Marital status is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the client 
is married. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
